THE ETHICS OF BELIEF AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Lisa Heldke and I opened Philosophers at Table by situating an individual in a grocery store.  That person has to select among options. Ideally, those selections would be guided by perfect information, indisputable prioritizations, and unlimited finances.  In reality, the individual cannot wait until conditions are perfect. There must be food on the table tonight.

This scenario is telling because

philosophers have, as William James complained, prized certitude over truth.   A version of the commitment to certitude was made famous when James sought to refute it. The position came from W.K. Clifford, a 19th century mathematician/philosopher: “It is wrong

always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.”

The assertion is both unproblematic and problematic.  Unproblematic because belief should be withheld if evidence is insufficient.   Problematic because “Insufficient” is a vague term. Vagueness brings with it borderline situations.  “The benefactor was ‘tall’.” It’s pretty clear the benefactor measured at least 5 feet. That still leaves a vast range.  Is 6 ft. the cutoff? 6.5 feet? Would 5 feet 7 inches be “tall” in some communities?

Clifford intimates there is a “one size fits all” criterion for “sufficient.”  This works for Clifford’s target, religious faith that celebrates lack of evidence. But, it is one thing to reject “I believe, although there is no evidence.”  It is another to adopt a one-dimensional grasp of “sufficient.”

Multiple situations necessitate commitment to one or another candidate for belief.  Those options may be, James suggests, living or dead, forced or avoidable, momentous or trivial. A live option is one that speaks to our situation here and now. A forced option is one  we cannot sidestep. A momentous option is one whose realization or failure of materialization will  be of major significance.

For a landlocked grocery customer the options “fresh oysters,” and “clams dug this morning” are dead ones. By contrast, the choice between  halibut and swordfish, is live. The fish choice, though, is not forced. The shopper can opt for meat or vegetarian. The need to find a staple anchoring tonight’s dinner is forced.  The decision is “momentous” to some degree because people need to eat. The momentous aspect increases when someone suffers from a food allergy.

If the need to elect among options is living, forced and momentous, the commitment has to be based on the best now available conjunction of information, guiding principles,  and likely consequences.

One  contemporary issue involving the Clifford-style criterion is  that of human-caused climate change. Opponents insist

that certitude has not been achieved. Evidence is “insufficient.”   The result: opting not to believe in anthropogenic climate change.

Here is where  James can help.  The dilemma: electing  to believe or not to believe in human-caused climate change. This dilemma is live, forced and momentous. To select, we need, here Clifford is correct, to determine whether the evidence is “sufficient.” We also need, following James, to admit that  deciding “sufficiency” is context-dependent.

The  situation can be laid out in this way: 97% of climate scientists accept anthropogenic climate change.  This does fall short of 100%. Still the split among scientists is overwhelmingly in one direction, a factor which leans toward “sufficient.””

Then comes the issue of “momentous.”  Integrating that concern would give us something like the following schema.
1. We elect to believe the anthropogenic option

A. and it turns out we are correct.

Then, we will have taken steps to lessen the damage that would otherwise be life-threatening.

B. and it turns out we are mistaken.

Then our actions would have been unnecessary. However,  the results of those actions would not be catastrophic.

    2. We elect not to believe the anthropogenic option

A. and it turns out we are correct.

Then, doing nothing will leave us with the status quo.

B. and it turns out we are mistaken

Then the consequences of inaction will be dire, especially for our grandchildren and great-grandchildren.

Fallibility is part of human life. 1.B and 2.B give scenarios of error.  But the consequences of error are not the same in both cases. 2.B gives us results that are catastrophically bad.

So, when trying to be reasonable,  it appears that the most compelling case points to selecting 1. It’s the option that combines evidence with benefits and minimizes risks.

In the end, the Jamesian take is not that unusual. Or rather, it’s only unusual among certain philosophers, those who make a fetish of certitude. Ordinary folks, like customers in a grocery store, accept the need to make commitments with the best available evidence.. Those commitments, as Clifford insisted, should be based on sufficient evidence. Clifford’s claim simply needs to be complemented by the Jamesian addendum: “sufficiency” is context-dependent.